The New Citizenship of the Risk and Surveillance Society – From a Citizenship of Hope to a Citizenship of Fear?

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Paper presented to the Social Change in the 21stCentury Conference
Centre for Social Change Research
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22 November 2002

ABSTRACT

This paper considers the tensions between personal liberty and the use of closed circuit television in the surveillance of citizens. The growing acceptance and seeming inevitability of increased risk and uncertainty in social life helps to underwrite surveillance measures such as CCTV alongside the monitoring of credit card transactions, email traffic, electronic messaging and so on. Important in this is the transformation of the category of citizen from notions of civil, political and social citizenship with their emphasis on a fullness of rights and participation, to the brittle citizenship of the responsible, 'new' citizen of the risk society.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps it was the recent screening by the ABC of the 1942 Arthur Askey film Ghost Train where one of the characters on arrival in deepest Cornwall is asked why she has a gas mask with her. She replies 'just in case' and on a railway platform in a country that was never to suffer a gas attack this seems somehow to be apposite when, on the Channel 10 news (25/10/02), a gas mask is displayed following a security conference in Brisbane that, at a cost of $200, is depicted as a necessary and affordable item given the apparent likelihood of just such an occurrence in Australia. But back to the Ghost Train - marooned at this railway station, the characters discover that the ghost train of the film's title is in fact a decoy train full of 'fifth columnists' or in today's parlance 'terrorists', busy stockpiling weapons for a Nazi invasion of Britain. Through a devastating mixture of end-of-the-pier humour and serendipity, Askey exposes the fifth columnists who, up to this point, have posed as ordinary English folk upon whom one could rely and in their moment of exposure these agents revert to guttural accents and poor manners as befitting the proffered role for foreigners.

It would simply be too much to claim a Jungian like synchronicity for these events in terms of the screening of a1942 propagandistic film and a post-Bali conference promoting gas masks and sterile tents for use in a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on Australia. However, the sense in which emerging discourses around a crisis of national security and the external threat allegedly posed by foreign agents, some of whom live amongst 'us', reflect the concerns and stratagems of earlier conflicts in articulating the priorities of the current war on terrorism is strong - we may have been here, or close to here, before. The growing clamour for increased security measures in

the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and Bali bombings lends a sharp emphasis to changes already emerging in the recasting of the category of the responsible citizen in Western social democratic formations. The active and responsible citizen of the post-September 11 (and post-Bali) security epoch is now demonstrably different from the post-World War Two period when T.H. Marshall made a compelling case for a broad and inclusive concept of citizenship that defies reduction to narrow legal forms concerned with rights to residence and passports.

CITIZENSHIP

Marshall's work originates in, and reflects, the concerns of the era of post-Second World War social reconstruction and the creation of political institutions pledged to secure European unity. The signing of the Charter of the United Nations on 26 June 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948 and The Declaration of the Rights of the Child on 20 November 1959, are significant milestones in the expression and pursuit of universal human rights (Rees and Wright 2000). The creation in Britain of the welfare state through the Beveridge Plan of 1942 and the implementation of Keynesian economic policies of full employment and high levels of public expenditure helped to create the social democratic welfare state and post war social, economic and political consensus. This consensus remained in place from the late 1940s until the onset of The New Right in the late 1970s (Tomlinson 1996, Culpitt 1992).

Marshall's work is, according to Jayasuriya (1996:21), 'highly influential' in theorizing citizenship as comprising three stages of broad historical struggle towards civil, political and social citizenship expressed in the form of a range of dynamic rights. Civil rights may be understood as individual rights to personal freedom in the form of 'liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice'. Political citizenship is 'the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body'. Social citizenship is more amorphous and complex including economic security and equal access to education and again in Marshall's own words is '…the whole range from a right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in a civilized society' (Marshall 1950:10-11).

Marshall's work has been subjected to critique. As Williamson (1997) argues, Marshall offers an Anglo-centric and historically specific conceptualisation based on the continuing existence of a social democratic welfare state with a white male, married breadwinner chiefly at its core. Issue is taken by Coles (1995) with Marshall's acceptance of the sustainability of policies of full employment (although the recent move to a 35 hour working week in France as one element within a policy of full employment is worth noting) and key assumptions around the stability of the nuclear family form and its underpinning of unwaged work by married women.

Criticism also comes from the New Right for whom the dismantling of the post-war social democratic consensus and the curtailment of the welfare state in a number of countries in the 1980s onwards provides the opportunity to challenge notions of rights, needs, social entitlements and equality within citizenship theorizing (Culpitt 1992). More recently Murray (1994) and Etzioni (1995) have asserted that political,

civil and social rights have exceeded responsibilities and form part of an alleged problem of welfare dependency and lack of community spirit. For conservative commentators, such as Murray (1994), there can be no rights until social duties and obligations have first been met and he proposes that the receipt of welfare benefits and other aspects of state support should be contingent on appropriate social behaviour and the execution of civil duties.
Due in part to the efforts of the New Right, in the form of Thatcherism in Britain and its resonance elsewhere, in seeking to dismantle the welfare state a new interest in Marshall's work has emerged because (criticisms of his formulation not withstanding), 'it provides a defensible justification of welfare and the welfare state' (Jayasuriya 1996:24).

Access to welfare provision is tied centrally to Marshall's concept of citizenship and a number of writers observe the challenge to universalist welfare assumptions in the Thatcher and Major governments in the U.K. in the 1980s and 1990s. The key shift is, according to Haines and Drakeford (1998), away from any genuine sense of collectivity and rights towards the (re)construction of citizenship whereby the state retreats where possible from the guaranteeing and distribution of benefits in favour of residual mechanisms deployed through charitable agencies and organizations. A case study in point is the example of the U.K. school leaver in the 1960s with a strong connection to older workers and with little differentiation drawn by the state between the citizen at the age of 18, 28 or 38. By 1996, according to Haines and Drakeford (1998:11) this position had been entirely, and perhaps irrevocably, reversed. This is also confirmed, by Tomlinson (1996), as largely true of the Australian experience.

RISK and RESPONSIBILITY
The move to the individualization of the citizen and reducing welfare provision, while key tenets within New Right thinking in the 1980s and 1990s, also helped to create the conditions whereby the overarching discourse of risk and responsibility has become the major and contemporary theme for governments of differing political persuasions. The increasing 'responsibilisation' of individuals is, according to Rose (2000), a case of the acceptance of responsibility for personal actions across a wide range of fields of social and economic activity, in choice of diet, savings and pension arrangements, health care decisions and choices, home security measures and personal investment choices.

When excavating the multitude of products now available on the market from terminal illness insurance to mortgage insurance cover in the event of unemployment or death, the text of persuasion, while usually remaining within requirements set by industry standards, nevertheless points to the alleged failings of the welfare state and its inability or reluctance any longer to provide care from 'the cradle to the grave' (Timmins1995).

The growth in private health insurance in the U.K. and elsewhere illustrates some sense of frustration with the alleged failings of national health systems as well as the notion of rational consumer choice and the apparent empowerment of the individual to purchase, in the market place, cover to protect against the shortcomings of the public health system. Health care provides a substantial case study of the bringing together of a range of sometimes disparate discourses encompassed within the rubric of 'risk'.

In the last twenty years or so, a risk culture may be seen to have developed wherein the concept of risk and its description, measurement, assessment and management has become central to the governance and management of economic, political and social activity. The work of Beck (1992) is important in setting out the thesis of the Risk Society in terms of the movement from the alleged certainties and predictabilities of modernity to the uncertainties of late modernity where the world is an increasingly dangerous place typified by risk and uncertainty of employment, security, relationships, income and prospects.

In the 'advanced liberalism' typical, according to Rose (2000), of late modern or postmodern social formations, self regulation by individuals is increasingly central to the execution of government social policy. In this formulation, the individual is cast as wholly responsible for their actions and life course decisions and is required to make the 'right' choices and if found wanting faces punishment in the form of exclusion or penalties. The 'wrong' choice over such life course issues as pension fund arrangements holds the consequence for the impoverished retiree of trying to access tightly constructed income support payments in increasingly vengeful welfare and social policy systems still largely predicated on assumptions of the deserving and the undeserving poor. The private pensions drive in the U.K. in the mid1980s, promoted by the Thatcher government under the banner of individual choice and opening state pension provision to the discipline of market forces, proved to be a major 'misselling' scandal with many state employees duped into leaving government schemes for inferior performing private schemes.

In a move costing £1,100 million (BBC Online 27/10/02) participant companies have been compelled to refund monies lost compared to how the pension plans would have performed if retained in government schemes. This illustrates a remedy to a scenario of deceitful and commission hungry salespersons that might in current times be (re)constructed as poor choice making on the part of irresponsible consumers. This response would fit well with what Petersen and Bunton (1997) term as the 'internalization of risk' whereby such overt acts of dishonesty by the private market become instead personal matters as pieces of 'risky' and speculative behaviour which warrant individual acceptance and 'reflexivity', as Giddens (1991) would have it, in terms of reviewing, on an ongoing basis, one's lifestyle, future plans and options. The responsible individual is, according to Kemshall (2002), 'prudential' in being both rational and entrepreneurial in making informed decisions and choices on key personal and social issues and being prepared to shoulder the burden of making flawed decisions and accepting the full run of the implications rather than looking to government to provide compensation or deliverance. The term 'prudence' is significant in being the watchword of the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, in delivering his first budgets from 1997 which honoured the spending limits of the previous conservative administration. A feature of this government's approach to matters of social policy and welfare payments, which is also consistent with their Tory predecessors, is the critique of the despised visage of the so called 'nanny state' in favour of the 'something for something' society wherein 'for those who can, work, those who can't, security' (Hann 2000).

The example of health care again provides an instance of the reconstructed risk-bearing citizen. As Kemshall (2002) notes, health promotion initiatives in the U.K.

(and arguably Australia also), focus on the rationally informed individual making the 'right' choices on healthy eating, smoking, drinking, whether to buy 'preventative' private health cover, avoidance of 'risky' lifestyle behaviours and use of health care screening to prevent health problems, for example in the growing popularity of expensive whole body scans. This reflects Giddens' (1991) sense of subtle but fundamental shifts in welfare from the meeting of needs through benefits and services, to the prevention and displacement of risk.

However, good health is, as Kemshall (2002) suggests, no longer a matter of rights within a broad social citizenship but a duty of the prudential, responsible citizen in reducing the burden of care on the state through appropriate and informed actions. Failure to adopt a healthy lifestyle then becomes, according to Lupton (1999), a sign of moral inadequacy and personal dysfunction, requiring increased surveillance and sanctions.

SURVEILLANCE

A number of western 'democratic' and non-western social formations can be accurately described as 'surveillance societies' (Lyon 2001). However, the nature of the surveillance taking place is complex, far reaching and, in many ways, insidious. Surveillance needs to be set in the broadest context of most everyday human acts, including: shopping with loyalty cards, paying for goods with any form of swiped card, visiting a doctor or dentist, using a cell phone, paying utility bills, interfacing with any level of government, logging on to computers or using the internet. The array of forms of surveillance has almost become too numerous to mention.

In their study of CCTV surveillance Norris and Armstrong (1999) note that, when added to the daily minutiae of surveillance listed here, CCTV surveillance in public space such as transport nodes of bus, tram and train stations, alongside the proliferation of other camera surveillance in speed cameras, traffic flow cameras and private camera systems in the workplace, the human being is potentially captured on a database somewhere, constantly. This gathering and compilation of information to form data achieves, in the words of Stalder (2002:120), a virtual solid form as a 'data body' which goes everywhere with the consuming citizen and goes before us in terms of carrying this weight of data to convey, for example, a track record of personal finance to a lending institution, or a snapshot of health records to a physician. On arrival, the citizen has already been 'measured and classified' and will be treated according to the criteria 'connected with the profile that represents us.'

Surveillance as information gathering and storage is not a product feature only of modernity, for, as Lyon (2002:2) notes, a 'simple and ancient' form of data compilation may be discerned in England in the 1500s in taxation, census and early Poor Law administration. This inaugural moment in the creation of the 'information state', while delineating limited rights to hold private property and receive parish poor relief, also built the infrastructure for potential and substantial efforts at social control, for example over religious orders or workers seeking to organize themselves. This paradox of surveillance holds true of contemporary society and tempers analysis to avoid over deterministic findings of Orwellian proportions of crude social control. Surveillance may be said to be dual faced, as Lyon (2002:4) notes, for the same ubiquitous infrastructure which can record 'private' telephone conversations from an orbiting satellite and log the tins of paint purchased on the way to work, can also

protect life, support social justice and encourage 'participation in political life', to the extent that seemingly negative aspects of surveillance can be disputed depending on one's standpoint. The phenomenon of routine mass surveillance is mutually implicated with the emergence of the 'risk society' which, in Beck's formulation (1992:27), comes about when the 'social, political, ecological, and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation elude increasingly the control and protective institutions of industrial society.'

The work of Foucault (1974, 1977) has application here in providing a critical context within which to interrogate issues of power, information and surveillance. He was inspired by Bentham's invention of the Panoptican or Inspection House, based on an isolated and regularly structured place in which the individual is subjugated to the norms of work, education and other disciplinary processes. Situated within the Panoptican, it is possible to sanction or reward the individual for her or his behaviour as all activities of inmates are monitored without their knowledge. For Foucault (1977:155) it is this gaze of surveillance, unknowingly received by the subject, that is fundamental to the exercise of power:

> There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself.

Certain aspects of the Panoptican may be discerned in the architectural order and arrangement of buildings of both open and closed institutions such as prisons, clinics, asylums and schools so as to facilitate the effectiveness and economy of the hidden or unseen gaze. As Foucault (1977:201) again notes:

> Hence the major effect of the Panoptican: to induce in the inmate a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.

A number of writers (Fopp 2002, Lyon 1994, 2001, 2002, Norris and Armstrong 1999) point to the opportunity afforded by Foucault's analysis to make sense of lines of continuity and change between earlier forms of surveillance and data assemblage and contemporary forms in the shape of CCTV and other surveillance modes. For example, Fopp (2002) argues that in schools, hospitals and social security offices, electronic surveillance has taken the place of the personal observation of service users. The panoptican is described by Foucault (1980:148) as 'a technology of power designed to solve the problems of surveillance' and from this statement it is possible to hypothesise outwards to critique the role and purpose of CCTV surveillance. However, Lyon (2002) and Fyfe and Bannister (1996) caution against injudicious use of concepts like the panoptican and their application to the contemporary urban streetscape without considerable qualification and modification, in order to fully take account of the contradictory, complex and contested nature of spatial and power

relationships. The stage of ‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose 2000) within modernity-post modernity requires considerable degrees of self-governance, regulation and surveillance whereby the individual is constructed both as a ‘new citizen’ and as a key site of self-management. An example of this self-management and surveillance is the welfare system in both the U.K. and Australia. Despite the national governments (one ‘new’ Labor, one conservative) seemingly being of differing political persuasions, strikingly similar imperatives around reducing welfare dependency, benefit fraud and emphasizing the centrality (wholesomeness) of paid work, may be discerned.

In Centrelink unemployment benefits and their ethos of ‘mutual obligation’ a panoply of surveillance, self-reporting and disciplinary measures, such as ‘breaching’, is enacted. The completion of ‘dole diaries’ to document the jobseeker’s efforts to obtain employment (usually a minimum of 10 verifiable efforts in a fortnight) are an illustration; the diary may be requested at any time, with refusal bringing forth disciplinary action. The diaries must otherwise be produced by a date decided by the Centrelink officer when giving the document to the job seeker and, on this appointed date, the diary is handed in to the Centrelink office, usually to a general member of staff, not the claimant’s ‘personal adviser’. If checks made on the veracity of entries are satisfactory, the claimant is not applauded for their efforts, but a new diary is sent in the mail and benefit payments continue, presumably because the unseen ‘gaze’ has been satisfied on this occasion. Alongside this self-scrutiny and surveillance, the individual is constantly required to report any changes in circumstances and all citizens are encouraged to inform on other citizens they know, or think they know, to be defrauding the welfare system in some way. Anonymous tip offs are given the status of credible evidence and are investigated. ‘Successes’ are defined in terms of terminated claims, repayments or prosecutions and are celebrated by the Minister responsible as preserving the system from miscreants (‘them’) so that the decent folk (‘us’) can continue to receive payments to which we may be due.

This is but a brief odyssey through a complex and labyrinthine system wherein the extent of responsibility for negotiating its paths successfully and lawfully which falls on the claimant is considerable and daunting in terms of the penalties for failure to do so. The language of articulation here, is the homespun recipe of honesty, decency and the absolute priority to protect tax payers’ interests, such that millions of dollars lost in defence or in other spending areas can be massaged away as ‘cost overruns’, while a small over payment to a single parent is represented as an intolerable atrocity perpetrated on the community of all tax payers, requiring harsh punishment, repayment and surveillance.

The construction of the community of taxpayers is an important discourse in suggesting that a commonality exists between such disparate interests. Similarly, the construction of the ‘othered’ ones in the form of the ‘dole bludger’ and ‘welfare cheat’ form significant and sclerotic discourses of exclusion which play a central role in the acceptance and ‘normalistion’ of the array of surveillance forms and technologies deployed.

CCTV

The normalisation of surveillance can be seen particularly in relation to CCTV over the last 10 years. As Lyon (2002) notes, the U.K. has the most developed system of both urban and rural public space cameras in the world and this growth of camera

surveillance has been achieved with very little, if any, public debate as to their benefits or otherwise, with the Bulger murder case and IRA terrorism pivotal points in their apparent efficacy. The emergence of so called 'Reality T.V.' in the form of 'Big Brother' and an assortment of variations on this theme have contributed, at least in part, to the normalisation, and even popularity, of camera surveillance - whether CCTV or 'web-cams' which permit surveillance and dissemination via the internet of the most intimate of human actions. As Groombridge (2002:39) notes, giving birth on the Internet is now popular, with the British 'glamour' model Jordan to do so on a 'pay-per-view' basis.

The use of acted CCTV images posing as 'real' footage of events in police dramas is also discernable in recent episodes shown on the ABC of The Bill, Pie in the Sky, and Wire in the Blood where images of car number plates, crowd scenes and street crime add an apparent slice of grainy reality through the perceived hallmark of the CCTV evidential image. The acceptance of a range of surveillance cameras overseeing public and private space, traffic conditions and city centres, suggests that it is now a seemingly 'natural' and more or less normal feature of urban and, increasingly, rural life to the extent that Graham (1998) argues, it has become the 'fifth utility' merging with the urban landscape in a similar way to the utility infrastructures of previous centuries. Increasingly as Graham and Marvin (2001) note, new urban housing and commercial developments are designed with unobstructed lines of sight to facilitate the operation of CCTV cameras already incorporated into the building plan. For the domestic market it is possible to install CCTV surveillance to 'guard' one's house and grounds and to view the cameras from monitors in the house and for remote monitoring also, for a fee, by a private security company.

A component in the acceptance of camera surveillance, apart from the sheer number and range already installed, is the much vaunted role they are alleged to play in reducing crime. Groombridge (2002) points to the over-celebration of CCTV successes which can undermine the contribution of appropriate policing methods and information provided by members of the public towards the resolution of a case. The U.K. Home Office, itself a major purchaser of CCTV systems for town centre surveillance operations, issued guidance against the uncritical installation of CCTV systems stressing the cost effective contribution that improved street lighting and design improvements can make to better community safety and crime reduction (Home Office 1994). At roughly the same time as issuing this guidance, Norris and Armstrong (1999) note that eighty per cent of the crime prevention budget was being spent on camera supply and installation without any formal system of evaluation. It is estimated that £600 million was spent this way in 1999 and that monitoring costs alone would be £100 million each year by 2000, according to Baldrey and Painter (1998), while Norris and Armstrong (1999) estimate that up to17 million hours of CCTV footage are generated on a weekly basis.

The lack of critical evaluation of CCTV is being challenged by the work of Ditton (1999) and Norris and Armstrong (1999) but, as this comment from Ian Greenwood, Leader of Bradford Council, Yorkshire in 1998 suggests, CCTV, as a crime reduction and community safety tool funded by local councils, is here to stay. He states: 'There will be no evaluation, we are committed to CCTV; there will be money spent on it; it is popular with working people' (Bradford Telegraph and Argus 01/12/98:4).

This is an important division drawn between ‘working people’ and the category of the ‘others’ not mentioned, such as those who are not in employment; and the propensity of CCTV surveillance to act as a lens of discrimination is suggested in this comment from a local councillor in Newcastle (U.K.) on the case for a CCTV system on the West End estate (KDIS Online 21/12/99):

> It’s to do with the kind of community you have here. You have a problem of loose families. Single mothers, men who drift around. There is a dislocation from normal expectations, from normal manners, if you like, a breakdown of basic rules and social codes. What do you do with working-class men who no longer have any possibility of a job and no means of earning self respect? They are too poor, and too poorly educated to take collective responsibility for their own problems. To some extent, I suppose, the cameras are a form of containment.

This observation is full of value assumptions which cannot detain us here, but the work of Norris and Armstrong (1999:154), in 592 hours of monitoring at three varied sites in the U.K., noted that the young, the male and the black, were systematically targeted, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder, but for ‘no obvious reason’. Forty per cent were targeted on the basis of ‘belonging to a particular or subcultural group’, with black people being more than twice as likely to be watched than others, and for longer time periods. Most of this surveillance targeting is based on little more than the camera operator’s ‘normative ecology’, or value-based assumptions as to who the ‘usual suspects’ are or should be. For example, those persons considered to be ‘out of time and out of place’ were watched while persons in uniform were completely exempt from targeting, possibly being acknowledged by the camera operator as ‘one of us’. Another feature noted by Groombridge (2002:32) was the amount of male-on-male violence reported to police, while violence to women from men they were with was not. As he suggests, ‘even if surveillance systems are all seeing they are not all knowing’.

The security industry maintains that CCTV is not ‘Big Brother’ in the sense of Orwell’s 1984 scenario, but instead a ‘Big Friend’ watching out for people using public space, to protect them from nefarious individuals (the poor and desperate) out to get them. The assertion that cameras are there to protect people again provides a basis for their assumed effectiveness and normalisation but, given the proclivities of camera operators and the expense of real time monitoring, there is the possibility that the camera on which one may rely in a car park or underpass may not be monitored in real time. As a recent report by NACRO (The National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders 2002), suggests, CCTV has a place within a broad and variegated crime reduction and community safety program, but warns against over-investment in camera technology at the expense of more durable and less costly measures such as better street lighting and more visible policing of all areas. These are likely to be more effective in promoting personal safety than relying on cameras if ‘big friend’ is not watching tonight. The report also cautions local councils to be skeptical about security industry claims of effectiveness given the high cost of camera systems and their continual and expensive upgrading, for example, into facial recognition systems and network interfacing. It is this last point that raises issues for a number of commentators for, increasingly through technical upgrades and

developments, publicly funded traffic, surveillance and security CCTV systems and private camera systems can be enabled to network when required.

While the creation of compatible surveillance databases which quietly indulge in algorithmic data matching exchanges may not, at face value, threaten democracy, for Norris and Armstrong (1999:173), accountability and oversight are key, if still underdeveloped, processes; 'democratic institutions are not assured, they can and have been captured by totalitarian regimes of both the left and right'. Further, Geraghty (1998:17) argues, 'the only criterion which distinguishes a modern traffic control system from the apparatus of political control is democratic accountability'. The question of democratic accountability is vexed and, as Taylor (2002) notes, forms a dialectic between changes in behaviour patterns and rapid developments in surveillance technology which may result in new regulations and protocols and technological apparatus to circumvent or negate them.

In this way data protection and privacy measures enacted in a number of countries are likely to be only partially successful in the face of surveillance equipment that can transmit images and information at a speed that can subvert most regulation before the democratic process can come into play. The data might already be downloaded to remote servers possibly in several countries, with differing regulatory and oversight frameworks. The use of electronic audit programs, themselves a form of surveillance, to give a detailed account of the operational use of CCTV cameras in terms of zoom, tilt and pan actions and the limiting of camera function and facilities to only what is required by the surveillance setting is, according to Taylor (2002), one instance of accountability that would permit the watchers to be effectively watched and also provide an oversight model for other surveillance modes.

CONCLUSION

Attempts at social change in the twenty-first century must take a range of issues into account in order to be relevant and effective. A key issue concerns the concept of citizenship itself, which has, in the last twenty to thirty years, undergone a transmutation from the heady possibilities conjured up by Marshall in the immediate post-Second World War period. The 'new citizen' of the risk society is the socially responsible, self-regulating data subject who, according to Kemshall (2002), receives surveillance as an everyday routine and supports its application in order to preserve what is seen as the virtues of democratic, consuming society. The active 'new citizen' is implicated in their own surveillance and that of others, albeit in subtle ways that connote 'free will' but are nevertheless constrained.

The advance of the New Right in Britain and its equivalent political processes elsewhere in particular around attempts at the 'rolling back of the welfare state', contributed to the reconfiguration and constriction of the meanings attached to citizenship, captured in eloquent infamy by Margaret Thatcher in stating: 'There is no such thing as society. There are only individual men and women, and there are families' (Woman's Own 31/10/87). The discourses given comfort in this assertion emphasise duty and responsibility over civil, social and political rights and to an extent still inform contemporary debates on active citizenship and citizenship education for young people in particular.

There is, however, resistance to aspects of surveillance and positioning as data subjects and this may be harnessed by social change agents. As Lyon (2002) notes, much of the same surveillance and CCTV equipment deployed by the authorities has been used by citizens' oppositional groups, such as The New York Players who perform dramatic pieces to urban CCTV cameras. In a similar vein, Groombridge (2002) depicts the 'organised powerless' as forming an important moment of opposition in using camera technology linked to web sites, providing real time alternative evidence of the conduct of a protest action or event available to a world audience. The issue here is, whose account counts as 'truth' in the retelling of events to provide the folklore of resistance movements or court evidence.

As for the Ghost Train, Arthur Askey triumphs over the terrorists who, remember, had been posing as normal English folk, by opening a bridge over a river as their train crosses it, thus condemning all the occupants to drown in the icy waters below. There is, perhaps, a certain economy to this process in excising the problem of the formal judicial process in the shape of evidence gathering and trials which might be envied by ASIO in its current smash and grab mode in preserving the security of Australia (The Australian 31/10/02). Sadly, what is being constructed in these exceptional times is a security state, not a social security state which might indeed be worth protecting in the promotion of a genuine attack on poverty and a commitment to the building of a better and more just society. Perhaps this ambition is the real Ghost Train which has yet to arrive, but one waits in hope, gas mask at the ready, just in case.

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